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Summary  findings
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Bulgarian competition office, the Commission for the  ex-employees of specific enterprises). Many enforcement
Protection of Competition,  for the years 1991-95.  cases basically  dealt with contract enforcement problems.
They provide descriptive statistics on the industry  Only a small percentage of cases concerned collusive
incidence of investigations, the types of behavior  practices that restricted entry/expansion, such as bid
investigated, and the frequency with which violations  rigging, price-fixing, and market allocation. And
were found and penalties imposed.  remedies for egregious violations of the law were not
Although the Commission tried to focus on  dire enough to give firms a strong incentive to abide by
nontradable  sectors and to target both cartel and abuse-  the law.
of-dominance cases, the remedies they imposed appear  Recently proposed amendments to the law should go
to have been rather ineffective.  some way toward allowing the Commission to focus
Moreover, instead of focusing on hard-core  more narrowly on anticompetitive practices and to
anticompetitive behavior, much of the Commission's  strengthen the law's deterrent effect.
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and information.I.  Introduction
Bulgaria, as did many other former centrally-planned  economies,  adopted  competition  legislation  as
part of the reform of legal instruments  that were required in the transition  to a market economy. Many
policy advisors strongly supported  the implementation  of antitrust  mechanisms  in these countries,
reflecting  the highly concentrated  nature of industry in their economies. It was also often argued that
in the process of privatizing  state firms, the need for antitrust was crucial, as many of the enterprises
involved  were large, if not dominant. Indeed,  in some countries  competition  authorities  were given the
mandate  to impose  de-monopolization  prior to privatization  (e.g., Poland). The legal regimes that were
put into place have been the subject  of a number  of studies.' More recently  empirical assessments  of the
enforcement  of antitrust legislation  have begun to emerge. Much of this literature  has centered on the
Visegrad countries  (the Czech Republic,  Hungary, Poland and the Slovak  Republic), in part reflecting
the availability  of information  in English  and their more advanced  status in shifting  to a market
economy.
A recent and comprehensive  empirical  study of competition  policy in the Visegrad countries  by
Fingleton  et al. (1996)  concludes  that a preponderance  of enforcement  cases concern abuse of
dominance. Many of these revolve around allegation  of unfair trade practices  and are basically
contract  enforcement  problems. Only a small percentage  of cases were found to concern  hardcore
collusive  practices  that restrict entry/expansion,  such as bid rigging, price-fixing,  market allocation,
etc. The study also concludes  that remedies  for egregious  violations  of the law are not sufficiently  dire
to ensure that firms have a strong enough incentive  to abide by the law.
l See e.g. Estrin and Cave (1993), Mastalir  (1993), Pittman  (1992), Saunders  (1993), and
Willig (1992).This paper focuses on the activities  of the Bulgarian  competition  office, the Commission  for the
Protection  of Competition  (CPC), drawing upon its Annual  Reports for 1991-95  and interviews  with
CPC staff.  Our objective  is to analyze  the activities  of the CPC and detennine to what extent the
conclusions  of Fingleton  et al. (1996) carry over to Bulgaria. The plan of the paper is as follows.
Section  II summarizes  the main elements  of the Bulgarian  competition  law.  Noteworthy  is that in
addition  to standard  provisions  relating  to abuse of dominance  and collusion, it also includes  wide
ranging  prohibitions  on 'unfair' competitive  practices. This covers activities  such as false advertising,
trademark  infringement,  and restrictions  on the ability  of ex-employees  of a firm to be engaged  by
another firm in the same line of activity.  Section  III briefly describes  recent economic  developments
in Bulgaria and reports data on the evolution  of a number of key variables including  concentration,
import penetration,  and foreign investment  during 1991-95. Bulgaria differs from the Visegrad
countries in that there has been much less privatization  of industry  since 1991; indeed, up to end-1995
most manufacturing  enterprises  were still state-owned. Although  entry into industrial  activity  was
liberalized  in 1991, most privately  owned firms that were registered  are operating in service sectors. 2
Section  IV analyzes the caseload  and activities  of the CPC during 1991-95  and provides descriptive
statistics  on the industry incidence  of investigations,  the types of behavior  that were investigated,  and
the frequency  with which violations  were found and penalties  imposed.
Although  in certain respects  the statistics  suggest  that the CPC has pursued an enforcement
strategy that economic  theory would endorse--e.g.  it has tended  to concentrate  its efforts in nontradable
sectors and pursued both cartel and abuse of dominance  cases--the  remedies  that are imposed  appear
rather ineffective. The courts have often declined  to approve  the penalties  sought by the CPC, and
inflation  has eroded the magnitude  of the fines that can be imposed. Moreover, a majority  of the
2 See Feinberg and Meurs (1994)  on the importance  of entry as a source of market discipline  in
transition economies.
2CPC's activity has not been targeted  at hardcore anticompetitive  practices. Most investigations  have
centered  on trademark  infringement  and similar  practices, and on the behavior of ex-employees  of
specific enterprises. Recently  proposed  amendments  to the law are discussed  in Section  V.  These
should go some way towards allowing  the CPC to focus more narrowly on anticompetitive  practices
and to strengthen  the deterrent  effect of the law.  Section  VI concludes.
II.  The Legal Framework
The "Law on the Protection  of Competition"  (published  in State  Gazette  No. 39 of 17 May 1991,
Correction State Gazette No. 79/1991)  constitutes  the legal framework  to protect free competition  in
Bulgaria. The Law deals with 'monopoly  positions' (Chapter  2), collusion  (Chapter 3) and 'unfair
competition'  (Chapter 4).
Monopoly  positions  covers not only monopolies,  but also dominant  positions  and to some
extent mergers. According  to Article 3, a monopoly  position  exists if an entity either has the exclusive
right to engage in a certain kind of economic  activity  by virtue of law or has a sales share that exceeds
35 % of the national  market. All entities  are prohibited  from adopting  decisions  that might lead to the
creation of 'monopoly  positions' if such decisions  significantly  restrict competition  or the free
determination  of prices (Article  4).  If mergers  lead to such 'monopoly  positions,' they are prohibited
as well (Article 5).  An exemption,  however, may be requested  from the competent  authority. If no
opposition  is registered within  30 days of notification,  authorization  is considered  granted (Article 6:2).
The law lists a number  of abuses  of 'monopoly  position' including  classical  cases like price-fixing,
restricting  output  or access to markets,  tie-ins, monopoly  pricing, and market allocation  (Art. 7).
Cartel agreements,  as well as decisions  of companies,  economic  groups, associations  or
persons, which explicitly  or implicitly  provide  for the creation  of a monopoly  situation  in the country,
or de facto lead to it, are declared  void. Contractual  terms restricting  one of the parties with respect to
3the choice of a market, suppliers, buyers, sellers or consumers,  except when the restriction  arises from
the nature of the contract  and is not injurious  to the consumers,  are prohibited. No single  person may
conclude  a contract  for agency, or for acquiring  exclusive  rights as a commission  merchant,  buyer or
seller of goods or services  of competitors,  if this leads to a reduction  in competition.
Chapter 4 prohibits "unfair competition"  which is defined as "any act or conduct  in carrying
out economic  activity which is contrary to bone fide trade practice and harms or threatens to harm the
interests  of competitors"  (Art. 11). Twelve  specific instances  of unfair competition  are listed in Art.
12:2, including  disparaging  the good name or trust in competing  goods or services,  spreading  false
statements  about competitors,  or presenting  true facts in a distorted  way;  attributing  nonexistent
properties to goods or services  when comparing  them with competing  goods  or services; suppressing  or
concealing  significant  defects  or dangerous  properties  of offered  goods or services;  offering or
advertising  goods  and services  with an outward appearance,  packaging, labeling,  name or other signs
which mislead or could mislead  consumers  as to the origin or  producer  of a good or service; using a
competitor's  business  name, trade mark or special  designations  without  permission;  advertising  goods
or services  not available  for meeting  consumer  demand  or in insufficient  quantity;  and nonperformance
of, or unilaterally  terminating,  a contract with the aim of concluding  a similar contract  with other
persons, to the detriment  of the competitive  opportunities  of the other party. Article 14 prohibits  the
divulgence  of trade secrets  and defines  when this constitutes  unfair competition. Article 15 deals with
unfair competition  by natural persons. It states  that no person is permitted  to join the management  of a
competing  firm operating in the same line of business  as the person's original  employer for the first
three years after leaving  an enterprise. This is one of the most noteworthy  provisions  of the law.  As
discussed  further in Section  III it has been invoked  frequently  by incumbents. 3
3 As discussed  in Section  V below, the CPC has proposed  that these provisions  be removed
from the competition  law.
4The Commission  for the Protection  of Competition  is entrusted  with the enforcement  of the
law.  The CPC consists  of a chairman,  two vice-chairmen  and eight members. All are appointed  by the
National Assembly  for a period of five years. The CPC can self-initiate  a case or respond  to complaints
brought by natural or legal persons. Self-initiation  often  occurs in instances  where "public  goods" are
involved, including  pricing behavior by utilities. Thus, the CPC may observe practices  that are likely
to violate the law (e.g., through press reports) but where it is unlikely that private incentives  are high
enough to induce  a complaint. It is also used as an educational  device, the objective  being to educate
the public regarding  the reach of the law. 4 Noteworthy  is that the Commission  cannot impose  penalties
in instances  where it has concluded  that the law has been breached  by a legal entity. In such cases the
Commission  must submit  a petition  before the competent  Bulgarian  Court of Law (Article 18.2 of the
Act).  The CPC may levy fines only upon natural  persons  that have been found in violation. In cases
where an abuse of monopoly  position is found to occur, the CPC may also suggest  the imposition  of
mandatory  maximum  or minimum  prices to the Council  of Ministers  or a body authorized  by it. Court
procedures  are very slow, in part because  about a third of all cases are in provincial  courts where the
CPC does not have local offices. As of mid-1996  there was a backlog  of 47 cases awaiting  decisions  in
such courts.  In cases of abuse of monopoly,  the maximnum  fine that can be imposed  by the courts is
specified in the competition  law to be Leva 250,000 (which was about US $10,000 in 1991).5 Other
violations  are subject  to potentially  stronger penalties,  including  confiscation  of profits.
III.  Market  Structure,  Imports  and Foreign  Investment  Trends
Before  turning to the activities  of the CPC it is helpful to briefly summarize  economic  developments  in
4 Interview with Mr. Stanilov,  Vice-Chairman  of the CPC, December  22, 1996.
5 No provisions  were made for indexing  fines.  As a result the real value of fines fell very
substantially  over time. At the end of 1996  the maximum  fine was equivalent  to $500.
5Bulgaria during 1991-95. Starting  in February 1991, Bulgaria  underwent  a "big bang" stabilization  and
structural reform  program. 6 Most  prices were liberalized,  subsidies  to most enterprises  cut, and tight
monetary, fiscal and incomes  policies adopted. Imports  were substantially  liberalized:  exchange
controls, quantitative  restrictions  and licensing  requirements  were abolished.  Collected  tariff revenues
as a share of total import value averaged less than 10 percent in 1993-94  (IMF, 1995). Export
restrictions, initially  maintained  for agriculture  and reflecting  food shortages in the country, were
mostly abolished  by 1993.
Two distinctive  factors characterize  Bulgaria  in the early transition  period.  First, although
efforts were pursued to de-monopolize  the economy,  privatization  was not pursued  with any vigor.
Transformation  of state-owned  enterprises  (SOEs)  and demonopolization  of state monopolies  was
pursued under auspices  of a new Commercial  Code introduced  in 1991. This led to the creation of
over 1,100 limited  liability  and some 400 joint-stock  companies  (Bogetic  and Hillman, 1995,  p. 17).
Subsequently,  many state firms were broken up into smaller entities,  and a number  of plants closed.
Entry and exit in Bulgaria  during 1992-94  mostly  involves  SOEs and reflects  the breaking  up of large
vertically-integrated  conglomerates,  which were sometimes  very dispersed geographically. The "new"
firms are therefore parts of old SOEs and remain public sector entities. "Entering" firms account for
roughly the same share of aggregate  output  as exiting  entities,  but employ  much less labor: on average
each exiting entity splits into two new enterprises,  each of which employs  less than a quarter of the
"old" labor force (Djankov  and Hoekman, 1996). Only about 10 percent of some 3,800 SOEs were
privatized  between 1992-95,  accounting  for just 2.5 percent of total assets (Claessens  and Peters,
1996). While the continued  existence  of a large state sector delayed  the creation  of new private
industrial firms, many small firms were created. As of mid-1994,  some 330,000 private firms were
6 See Bogetic  and Hillman  (1995)  for comprehensive  discussions  of the Bulgarian  economy  in
transition.
6registered, up from 24,000 at the end of 1989. Most  of these  firms focused  on the provision  of
services--both  at the retail level (e.g., distribution,  restaurants)  and business  services.
A second factor is subsidies  to large enterprises. Kotzeva  and Perotti (1996) report that 70% of
firm managers in 1994  expected  a government  bailout in case of poor performance. Soft loans
extended  to loss-making  enterprises  undermined  the capital  base of the banking  system  and reduced
access  to credit for other firms. However,  aggregate  subsidies  (budget  transfers and soft bank loans) to
the industrial  sector declined  from 16% of GDP in 1990  to 2% of GDP in 1995. As noted by
Claessens  and Peters (1996), the hard-core of large loss-makers  that continued  to be financed  through
loans from state-owned  banks, budget  transfers, and arrears (tax, wage, and inter-enterprise)  were
concentrated  in the utilities, mining, and construction  sectors. Industrial  firms generally  confronted
hard budget constraints  early in the transition.
Both factors have implications  for antitrust  activity. The absence  of privatization  may imply
that there is less cause for concern regarding  the exploitation  of market power by privatized  dominant
entities, as SOEs remain subject to Ministerial  control and oversight. At the same time, it may also
stifle entry, which in principle  was opened  up with the introduction  of the new Commercial  Code in
1991. The prevalence  of soft budget  constraints  and subsidies  could result in attempts  by consumers  to
use the CPC to ensure that subsidies  are passed  through to them; it might also give rise to complaints
by potential  entrants regarding  effective  foreclosure  of markets. However, as mentioned  previously,
most manufacturing  firms received  little in the way of direct subsidies. The fact that subsidies  tended
to go into non-tradables  makes  it logical  that most of the CPC's attention  should be devoted to non-
tradable industries.'
7 In contrast to competition  legislation  in certain Visegrad  countries  (e.g., Slovakia),  the CPC
has no mandate  to monitor and challenge  to provision  of subsidies  on the basis of their impact on
competition. This may change  once the law has been amended  (see Section  V below).
7[Table 1 here]
Some basic economic  indicators  of market structure  in industries  that have been subject  to
antitrust investigations  are provided in Table 1. Virtually  all tradable sectors experienced  a significant
increase in import penetration,  suggesting  that imports  are a major source of market discipline.
Apparel and consumer  appliances  stand out, imports  accounting  for over 70 percent of consumption  in
1995. Concentration  ratios for these two industries  are also low, the top five firms accounting  for one-
third or less of total sales in 1995. Import  penetration  is much lower, and growth in imports  much
more subdued in chemicals, agro-industry,  and food. In general, concentration  ratios declined
significantly  during 1991-95,  with the exception  of chemicals,  communications,  publishing,
transportation  and utilities. Table 1 also provides  data on inward foreign  direct investment  (FDI).  In
absolute  terms, most of the FDI has gone into agro-industry,  food production,  and retail trade.
Although  the magnitude  of FDI into Bulgaria  is much lower than in the Visegrad countries  and
accounts  for only a small share of total output, foreign investors  turn out to have played an important
role in the enforcement  of antitrust.
IV.  Competition  Law Enforcement:  Descriptive  Statistics
Some 910 petitions  were filed with the CPC during 1991-95  (Table  2), more than in any of the
Visegrad countries. 8 Of these 521 or 57 percent were accepted  for investigation. 9 This is quite
substantial. For example,  during 1984-93,  the ten-year  period following  adoption  of a competition  law
8 Fingleton  et al. (1996, p. 107) note that during 1992-95,  767 petitions were received  by the
Czech competition  office; 275 by the Hungarian  competition  authorities;  535 in Poland;  and 512 in
Slovakia.
9 The Commission  need not accept  a petition  if the matter is not under its jurisdiction  (this
accounts for 28% of rejected  petitions),  there is no apparent  injury under the Law (another 32% of
rejections),  there has been a previous decision  by the CPC on the matter (26%), there is insufficient
information  (10%), or parties reach an out-of-court  agreement  (4%).
8in Portugal, only 55 investigations  were launched  (Barros and Mata, 1996, p. 20).  Service  industries
account for two-thirds  of all petitions  and represent  70 percent of cases accepted  for investigation.
Among service (nontradable)  industries,  retail trade and education  account for the highest  number of
complaints;  among tradable  sectors the food industry  attracts the most complaints. The lowest
acceptance  rates (investigations  launched  as a percentage  of petitions)  are found for complaints  relating
to apparel, foreign trade, and machinery  (only 20 to 30 percent of petitions  are investigated);  the
highest acceptance  rates arise in complaints  against  utilities, insurance,  the food industry, tourism,
transport and retail trade (70 to 80 percent). To a large extent this pattern is as one would expect.
Many services are not tradable  so that import competition  is not a significant  source of market
discipline. Moreover, sectors such as utilities  and transport  are highly concentrated  (Table 1). The
main "outlier" in terms of complaints  and investigations  is the food sector, as concentration  is low and
import competition  significant.
[Table 2 here]
Twelve percent of all petitions  eventually  led to a finding  that the law had been violated  (110
out of 910 petitions). Although  the law distinguishes  three major reasons for intervention--abuse  of a
dominant  position  (Chapter 2), cartels (Chapter  3), and unfair competition  (Chapter  4)--in practice
virtually  all of the cases are based on Chapters  2 and 4 (Table 3).  Collusive  arrangements  such as
price fixing and market allocation  are rarely the subject  of investigation. Only 15 of the 521
investigations  launched  concerned such practices. However, if "unfair competition"  cases are
excluded, cartel cases account for 12  percent of investigations,  and 28 percent of violation  findings.
For a new competition  regime these are relatively  high numbers.'" By far the largest share of all cases
is accounted  for by "unfair competition"  as defined  in Chapter  4 (some 374 or 72 percent of all
10 This point was suggested  by Joel Davidow.
9investigations)  followed  by abuse of dominance  (104 cases or 20 percent of the total). Cases related  to
price controls and the allocation  of export quotas  account for only a small share of all activity  (about 3
percent). Table 3 reveals that in some 21 percent of investigations  the CPC finds a violation. Positive
findings are more frequent in cases of "unfair  competition"  and cartel practices  than abuse of
dominance:  25 and 33 percent as compared  to 13 percent, respectively."
[Table  3 here]
It is helpful to summarize  briefly some representative  cases that have been brought before the
CPC to get a better impression  of its workload.
Monopolies  and Abuse of Dominant  Positions
(1) The state enterprise "Bulgartabak"  is a monopolist  in the buying, processing, and
distribution  of tobacco products. In 1990-92  the wholesale  price of tobacco  (which is dictated  by
Bulgartabak)  increased  3 to 5 times, while  the prices of materials  and services  used in the production  of
raw tobacco increased 10 to 30 times. The CPC concluded  that the opportunity  existed for the abuse of
monopoly  power and recommended  that the Council  of Ministers  adopt a minimum  price schedule  for
raw tobacco produce. Noteworthy  is that no account appears  to have been taken of foreign  competition
in the investigation.
(2) The only major foreign  player in the local food markets is Danone (dairy products).
Following  a series of articles  in newspapers  the CPC started a procedure  against Danone  under Article
3 (abuse of monopoly  position). The argument  in the press was that Danone is the sole buyer of raw
milk in the Sofia region and that it charges  monopoly  prices for its products. The CPC found that
Danone had a 15% market share in the yoghurt/milk  market in Bulgaria  and was one of 11 sellers in
1  Given the small number  of cartel cases that are investigated,  the 33 percent violation  rate is
not very significant  from a statistical  viewpoint.
10the Sofia region.  Although its prices were 10-15% higher than those of the competitors this was found
to be due to better quality.  The case was rejected.
(3) State enterprise Toploficachia-Sofia is the sole supplier of central heating in Sofia.  A
group of customers filed a petition arguing that the firm price discriminated against them. Toploficachia
has three separate heating tariffs: one for office buildings, one for production units, one for residential
housing.  Prices vary, with the private residents paying the highest price. The CPC found no violation
as prices were set according to the specific costs associated with each type of service.  A second claim
by customers was that the utility distributed a letter informing customers that different sections of the
city will be allocated to separate offices that would be in charge of collecting bills. Customers were
required to go through these offices (which involved an extra 5 % payment) or have their service cut off
(some were).  The CPC found this to be in violation of the law as the maximum price of energy
(including heating) was set by the government and additional mark-ups were prohibited.
Although Articles 5 and 6 of the law require the CPC to review all privatization cases involving
enterprises that have a monopoly position, the CPC has had only four cases as a result of the limited
number of privatizations that occurred up to 1996.  The CPC did not oppose any of the privatization
proposals.  However,  in one of these cases the CPC discovered after the fact that a there was a clause in
the privatization contract that allowed the firm to maintain a dominant share of the export quotas that
were issued for a specific commodity.  As a result an investigation was launched in 1996, and the
clause was removed.  With the decision of the Government to pursue mass privatization, the CPC will
be monitoring the behavior of investment funds that end up controlling major parts of individual
industries. 1
12 Interview  with  Mr. Stanilov  of the CPC.
11Collusive Practices
An important  cartel case concerned  allegations  of collusive  pricing by three regional
distributors  of dairy products brought by consumer  groups. The CPC found  that collusion  did occur,
and ruled in favor of the petitioners. The case was appealed  by the firms, and is still under review.
The firms argued that the decision  by the CPC violated  the law, as they do not jointly have a national
market share exceeding  35  %. Partly as a result of this case the CPC has proposed to amend  the law to
remove the national  market share criterion (see below).
Unfair Competition
(1) Eleven cases have been filed by Coca Cola (USA)  against local firms, either direct
competitors  or former subcontractors  in regional  markets under Art. 12. In each case Coca Cola
argued that the local firms used labels  and packaging  that copied those used by Coke.  Violations  were
found in two of the cases. (2) State enterprise 'Agromachinery-Karlovo'  filed a petition  against  its
former vice-president  who had registered  his own export-import  firm and used his position  as a contact
between 'Agromachinery'  and a Belorussian  firm producing  gas heating systems  to channel sales to his
firm.  The CPC found  this to be in violation  of Art. 15.
[Table  4 here]
Evaluation
A breakdown  of investigations  across sectors reveals  that the highest  proportion  of violations  are found
in the food industry (36 percent of all investigations),  retail trade and communications  (30 percent)
(Table 4).  As mentioned  earlier, food and retail trade are also the sectors where the most complaints
are made. Abuse  of dominance  allegations  are concentrated  in transport,  utilities  and retail trade--
together these 3 industries  account  for 70 percent of investigations  under Chapter 2.  However, a
violation  was found to have occured  in only 5 percent of all investigations  in these sectors. Cartel-like
12practices are heavily concentrated in the food and retail trade sectors.  "Unfair competition"
investigations affect a large number of industries, but again center mainly on the retail trade and food
industries.  Most of the cases in this category involve allegations of misleading advertizing/packaging
or claims of unfair competition by (ex-)employees (Art. 15).
About half of all petitions for investigations are brought by competitors, and much of the
remainder by consumers and state entities (e.g. Ministries) (Table 5).  The acceptance rate of the CPC
with regard to complaints by competitors has been relatively low compared to petitions brought by non-
producers (consumers, the State): 36 percent compared to 70-80 percent.  These statistics suggest that
the CPC gives priority to consumer concerns.  Noteworthy is that the absolute number of petitions by
competitors has been declining over time, falling from 146 in 1992 to 67 in 1995.  Activity by trade
unions has also dropped significantly, having virtually disappeared by 1995.  Conversely,  starting in
1994 the CPC began to self-initiate cases.  In 1995 some 22 percent of all investigations were ex
officio, up from zero in 1991-93.  Most of these cases pertained to "unfair  competition" rather than
abuse of dominance or cartel-like behavior.
Of 110 cases where the CPC concluded a violation of the competition law had occurred, 45
were addressed by the courts, of which 24 led to the imposition of fines and 21 were rejected by the
courts (i.e.,  the court determined that there was no cause for action).  The remaining 55 cases are
either still pending or in appeal before the Supreme Court.  The fines that were levied were generally
minor.  In 1992 there was just one case where a fine of Leva  14,000 ($600) was imposed; in 1993 fines
in 12 cases totaled Leva 32,000 ($1,500);  in 1994 total fines in 3 cases were Leva 45,000 ($800), and
in 1995 eight fines totaling Leva 875,000 were imposed ($10,670).  Although there appears to be an
upward  trend in the magnitude of the penalties that are imposed, the sharp rise in 1995 is due to two
large fines, one of Leva 600,000  and one for Leva 200,000.  The first fine was imposed on a firm that
bottled vodka and used the labels/trademark of the traditional producer; the second fine was imposed
13on a domestic  firm that labeled  its product as "California  Sun," the trademark  of a US firm that was
also operating  on the Bulgarian  fruit  juice market and that filed the complaint.
Foreign companies  have played a prominent  role in competition  cases. In addition  to Danone
and Coca Cola mentioned  previously,  Nestle,  Tuborg, California  Sun, Smirnoff,  Deutsche
Grammophon,  ABL-List  (Austria)  and PC World  were among  the foreign  firms that were either a
plaintiff  or defendant in competition  cases. In most cases the foreign  companies  were plaintiffs, and
were seeking  to protect their industrial  property (trademarks;  copyright). Some of these firms invoked
Art. 15 in an attempt  to hold on to staff (e.g., ABL-List). When  a respondent--e.g.,  Danone--the
claims tend to be abuse of dominant  position.
V.  Proposed  Amendments  to the Law
In a review of the literature on competition  policy  and reforming  economies,  Boner (1996) notes that
enforcers  of embryonic  competition  laws will make mistakes,  but that this is a natural and unavoidable
feature of competition  law. He emphasizes  that the important  question  is not whether  mistakes  will be
made, but whether  lessons  are learned and mistakes  corrected. Recent  efforts to change the
competition  law in Bulgaria  suggest  this is the case. A number  of amendments  to the current law have
been proposed by the CPC, to the Council  of Ministers. The objective  of the proposed  changes  is  to
improve  enforcement  and  align the law more closely  to the provisions  of the European  Community
Treaty.  The Council  of Ministers  has sent a set of proposed  amendments  to Parliament,  which is
expected  to adopt  them in the course of 1997.'3
Major proposed changes  include the following. Chapter  4 on unfair practices  would be
removed from the competition  law. The practices  that are addressed  would be left for the courts to
3 What follows  draws  upon interviews  with CPC staff in January 1997.
14consider on the basis of the Commercial Code and the Labor Law.  Fines would become indexed by
defining them in the law as multiples of the legislated minimum wage (which is adjusted to inflation on
a monthly basis).  The definition of dominance would also be changed.  Currently a necessary
condition is a 35 percent share of national sales of a product.  This has led to instances where a firm
that abuses a dominant position on a regional or municipal market cannot be found in violation of the
law.  The CPC has therefore suggested that the 35 percent criterion be applied to the relevant, rather
than the national market.  Another proposed change concerns the role of the courts.  Currently,  the
courts review CPC decisions when determining whether to impose sanctions.  As mentioned
previously,  this has led to lengthy backlogs and delays in the process.  In order to speed up
enforcement,  the CPC has suggested that it be permitted to raid the premises of firms without obtaining
a prior permission by a court (which may take two to four weeks and remove any element of surprise)
and be able to  issue decisions and impose fines against both natural and legal persons (presently it may
only do so if natural persons are involved).  All such decisions would remain subject to appeal before
the courts, and any raids would need to be approved ex post by the court.
At the time of writing the precise nature of the amendments that will emerge depend on
Parliament. 1
4 In principle,  shifting enforcement of the commercial code and contracts to the courts
would be beneficial as it would free up resources to focus on anticompetitive practices that are of
greater importance to the functioning of the economy.  The broad thrust of the proposed amendments
should improve the situation.
14  It is worth mentioning  that the proposed  amendments  that have been submitted  to Parliament  are
reportedly  less far-reaching  than what was originally  proposed  to the Cabinet  by the CPC.  For example, the CPC
had also proposed  that monitoring  the conduct  of natural  monopolies  (utilities)  become  the responsibility  of a
separate regulatory  body. The Council  of Ministers  rejected  this on the basis of scarce  resources.
15VI.  Conclusions
As is the case in other Central and Eastern European  countries,  the competition  authorities  in Bulgaria
have been very active, investigating  over 500 cases in the 1992-95  period. Little of this enforcement
activity  has been directed  at hard-core  anticompetitive  behavior. Instead, much  of the case load
concerns issues  that in most market economies  would  involve  enforcement  of private contracts  or
property rights.  Usually  this would  occur through the judicial system. Alternatively,  independent
administrative  bodies may be allocated  the task of enforcing  contracts. In either case, the competition
or antitrust authority would generally  not get involved  in such cases. In Bulgaria, the Commission  for
the Protection of Competition  cannot impose  penalties  in any event; it must go through the court
system. The CPC therefore fulfills  a buffer or intermediary  function, filtering  the cases that end up in
court.  This is not necessarily  efficient,  as the courts reject about  half of the cases submitted  by the
CPC.  The focus on such cases has diverted a substantial  share of the CPC's resources  away from what
arguably  should be its core activity--combating  collusive  practices  that severely  restrict competition.
To some extent the enforcement  of the current law may have restricted  competition,  in
particular as regards the provision in the law restricting  the mobility  of managers. The economic
rationale  for this provision is weak at best, as this is again a matter  of contract  enforcement. By
preventing  mobility  the law reduces  the value of the human capital  of managers and reduces  the
incentive  for the formation  of new firms, including  entry by foreign  investors  (who will generally  seek
to hire local expertise). This is recognized  by the CPC, as is reflected  in the proposed  amendments  to
the competition  law discussed  earlier.
Most of the abuse of monopoly  (dominant  position)  cases result in a finding  that the law has not
been violated. Moreover, in many cases the penalties  that are imposed  are minor and take a substantial
amount of time to materialize  as the court system is overburdened,  further reducing  their incentive
effects. In conjunction  with the finding  that there have been few collusion-type  cases, it seems
16therefore that firms engaging  in anticompetitive  practices  may have little to fear from the competition
authorities. This is perhaps not that important  in tradable  industries. Import  barriers are low in
Bulgaria, and import competition  is vigorous." 5 But it is also clear that in a number  of sectors market
power of incumbents  remains significant,  and that there is substantial  scope for behavior that restricts
entry or expansion. Significant  potential  therefore appears  to exist to strengthen  the effectiveness  of
competition  enforcement  in Bulgaria  by focusing  the activities  of the CPC more frequently  on
anticompetitive  practices  that restrict entry and expansion.
At the same time it must be noted that the CPC was confronted  with a situation  where relatively
little privatization  occurred, thereby  perhaps reducing  the perceived  need for scrutiny  of the behavior
of state-owned  enterprises. As a start-up  entity, the CPC (and the courts) were also required to take
into account  the lack of experience  of firms and consumers  with the concepts  and principles underlying
a competition  law.  In this context it is by no means  exceptional  that fines imposed  were often low. As
noted by Boner (1996, p. 52), national  courts rarely impose  high fines for violations  of new
competition  laws.  It takes time for participants  to become  aware of and take into account  the new rules
of the game.
The Bulgarian  experience  with competition  law appears to be similar to other economies  in
transition in that the legislative  framework  and enforcement  practices  evolve as experience  is obtained.
For example, both the Czech and Slovak  Republics  adopted  new competition  legislation  only a few
years after adopting  a competition  law in 1991  (when  they still formed  Czechoslovakia). The Polish
competition  statute was amended  twice after 1990  (Fingleton  et al. 1996). It takes  time for a
competition  statute to be enforced and for firms to internalize  competition  legislation. In this transition
economies  such as Bulgaria are no different  from other countries  that adopt  competition  legislation  for
15  Djankov and Hoekman  (1996)  conclude  that import  competition  has had a significant  impact
on the average price-cost  margins  of firms in tradable  industries  in Bulgaria.
17the first time.' 6 The proposed  amendments  to the law, if adopted, should  help strengthen  the pro-
competition  dimensions  of the law and its enforcement.
16 See for example  Fingleton  (1996)  and Barros  and Mata (1996)  on the experience  of Ireland
and Portugal.
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19Table  1: Import  Penetration,  Foreign  Investment  and  Concentration  Ratios,  1991-95
Sector  FDI, 1991-95  Induistry  Share  in  Import Share  in  Import Share  in  Concentration  Concentration
(US$ Million)  Total FDI (%)  ToEal  Total  1991  (Top 5  1995  (Top 5
Consumption  1991  Consumption  1995  Share  in Total  Share  in Total
(  . %  )  . (  %)Sales)  Sales)
Agribusiness  48.4  8.8  4  13  52.4  22.1
Apparel  21.2  3.9  49  73  28.2  24.1
Chemicals  13.4  2.6  21  26  69.2  63.8
Comtnunicatioiis  19.7  3.6  0  I  100.0  98.2
Consiruction  7.1  1.3  2  13  37.1  22.4
Consumer  Appliances  18.3  3.4  34  76  48.2  33.9
Education  4.2  0.8  0  7  53.2  24.6
Entertainment  17.8  3.2  0  0  93.8  40.2
Food Industry  121.2  22.1  41  37  21.1  16.3
Health care  7.2  1.3  0  0  82.1  52.3
Insurance  31.7  8.9  0  1  78.3  61.7
Machinery  14.2  2.6  31  41  36.2  22.4
Foreign  Trade  2.1  0.4  0  0  74.2  13.8
Publishing  3.4  0.6  3  18  92.1  86.3
Retail Trade  111.9  19.4  0  °  68.3  45.9
Tourism  37.1  6.8  0  0  64.2  32.7
Transport  43.5  7.8  I  4  80.2  77.2
Utilities  23.8  4.3  0  0  91.2  82.9
Sources: Foreign Direct Investment data from the Agency for Foreign Investment;  Import penetration and concentration ratios from Annual
Statistical Yearbook, various issues.
20Table  2. Commission  for the Protection  of Competition:
Petitions  Filed and Accepted*
No  Sector  1991-92  1993  1994  1995  Total  Acceptance
(%,  1991-95)
I  Agribusiness  7 (4)  9 (5)  9 (3)  8 (7)  33 (19)  57
2  Apparel  13  (4)  7 (2)  6 (I )  16  (4)  42  (11)  26
3  Chemicals  7 (4)  10  (7)  10  (3)  17  (7)  44 (21)  50
4  Communications  4(2)  7  4  4  12)  2  24 (10)  j  41
5  Construction  22 (13)  11 (4)  7 (3)  9 (5)  49 (25)  50
6  Consumer  Appliances  7 (3)  13 (3)  11  (2)  6 (2)  37 (14)  38
7  Education  15  (9)  39  (22)  32 (6)  9 (10)  115 (41)  36
8  Entertainment  14  (10)  7 (4)  14  (9)  6 (3)  41 (26)  63
9  Food  Industry  B (8)  32 (28)  9 (4)  19  (16)  68  (56)  82
10  Health Care  8 03)  12  (5)  8 (1)  7 (6)  35 (15)  42
II  Insurance  5 (2)  4 (4)  4 (4)  3 (3)  16  (13)  82
12  Machinery  20 (10)  13  (3)  19  (1)  12  (f  64  (19)  30
23  Foreign Trade  21 ( I  )  ItI (4)  8 (0)  1  1 (6)  51 (111  21
14  Publishing  17  (8)  5 (5)  10  (6)  11  (10)  43 (29)  67
15  Retail Trade  29 (26)  62  (50)  33  (25)  33 (30)  154  (131)  73
26  Tourism  5 (3)  2 (1)  2 (2)  2 (2)  11  (8)  73
17  Transport  20 (9)  17 (13)  18(I )  13  (12)  68 (45)  72
18  Utilities  I.I (7)  5 (4)  97  ()  9(9)  32 (27)  84
TOtl  237 (126)  266(167)  211 (89)  196(139)  910(521)  57
Note:  The number of accepted petitions by the Commission is in parentheses.
Source:  Annual Report of the Commission for the Protection of Competition (in Bulgarian), various issues.
21Table 3: Nature of Complaints  and Decisions  in Investigations  Undertaken
. ______________________________________________  1991-92  1993  1994  1995  Total  % Violation
Abuse of Monopoly  Power (Chapter  2:  Arts.  3-7)  22 (2)  20 (5)  29 (4)  33 (2)  _  104 (13)  13
Cartel-like  Arrangements  (Chapter  3: Arts.  8-10)  1(0)  8 (2)  5 (2)  1 (1)  15 (5)  33
Unfair Competition  (Chapter  4)
- packaging  and advenising  (Art.  12)  33 (7)  57 (11)  24 (11)  45 (6)  159 (35)  22
- attraction  of competitors'  clients (Art.  13)  13 (5)  15  (4)  6 (4)  8 (1)  42 (14)  33
- business  secrets violations  (Art.  14)  5 (1)  8 (2)  4 (1)  7 (1)  24 (5)  20
- by employees (Art.  15)  52 (6)  56 (19)  16 (8)  25 (5)  149 (38)  25
Total Chapter  4  103 (19)  136 (36)  50 (24)  85 (13)  374  (92)  25
Price Controls  (Art.  16)  0  0  0  2  2  N.A.
Trade  Quotas  (Art.  17)  0 (0)  5 (0)  5 (0)  4 (0)  14 (0)  0
Total  Number  of Decisions  126 (21)  167 (43)  89 (30)  139 (16)  521 (110)  21
Note:  Number  of  violations  found  by the  Commission  in parentheses.
Source:  Annual  report  of  the  CPC,  various  issues.
22Table 4. Petitions Accepted for Investigation (by sector and type)
Sector  Abuse  of  Chapter  2  Packaging  Attraction of  Business  Unfair  Total by
Monopoly  'cartel'  cases  and  Competitors'  secret  Competition  Sector  Violation
Advertizing  clients  Violations  by (Ex-)
_____________  ~~Employees
Agribusiness  3 ()  2 (0)  14  (2)  19  (3)  16
Apparel  7  - - I (I  (0)  3  (0)  11  (0)  0
Chemicals  I (0)  I(0)  8 (2)  11  (2)  21 (4)  |  9
Communications  4 (0)  . . 6 (3)  10  (3)  30
Construction  I (0)  6 (0)  5 (1)  I (0)  12 (4)  25 (5)  20
Consumer  5 (1)  3 (3)  3 (0)  3 (0)  14  (3)  21
Appliances  __________
Education  3 (2)  7 (2)  7 (2)  24 (3)  41 (9)  22
Entermainment  16 (2)  2 (0)  S (1)  26 (3)  l 
Food  Industry  I (0)  8 (3)  38  (10)  9 (6)  56 (19)  36
Health care  - 2 (0)  13  (3)  15  (3)  20
Insurance  6 (2)  4  3 (1)  13  (3)  23
Machinery  13  (1)  2 (0)  --  4 (0)  19  (1)  5
Foreign Trde  '  (3)  _  - 4 (0)  9 (3)  30
Publishing  3 (1)  I(0)  9 (2)  8 (3)  8 (2)  29 (8)  27
Retail  Trade  24  (2)  3 (1)  56  (15)  I (0)  I (0.  34  (17)  119  (35)  29
Tourism  8 (0)  8 (0)  0  °
T-ansoor  22 (2)  I  (1)  . 6 (2)  17  (2)  45(6)  |  13
Utilities  25 (1)  - - 25(1)  __  4
Total  105  (14)  15  (5)  159  (32)  42 (14)  24  (5)  149  (381
Notes:  Number of violations found  by the Commission in parentheses.
Data do not include cases relating to price controls and trade quotas.
Source:  Annual Report of the Commission for the Protection of Competition (in Bulgarian), various issues.
23Table 5: Origin of Petitions Filed and Accepted
No  Source  1991-92  1993  I994  1995  Total  Average
acceptance
_______________  rate
I  Competitor  firms  146 (50)  120 (47)  101 (23)  67 (37)  434 (157)_  36
2  State entities  26 (22)  51(47)  36 (18)  58 (47)  1'-i (134)  78
3  Private  persons  (consumers)  15 (13)  37 (31)  15 (11)  24 (18)  91 (73)  80
4  Consumer  organizations  35 (29)  41 (34)  31 (13)  15 (6)  122 (82)  67
5  Trade  unions  15 (12)  14 (5)  6 (2)  I(0)  36 (19)  53
6  J  Ex Officio CPC  ] 2  J 3100
-- Total  I237  (126)  26  17  1  8)  1196  (139)  I-1  51
Note:  Number  of  petitions  accepted  for  investigation  by  the  Commission  in  parentheses.
Source:  Annual Report of the Commission for the Protection of Competition, (in Bulgarian) various issues.
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